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THE LAME DUCKS OF MARBURY
John Copeland Nagle*
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams had not been the best of
friends before the election of 1800, and their competition for the
presidency gave them ample occasion to ponder each other's
faults. Yet it was easy for Jefferson to identify the single incident
that troubled him most. As he wrote to Abigail Adams in 1804:
I can say with truth that one act of Mr. Adams' life, and one
only, ever gave me a moment's personal displeasure. I did
consider his last appointments to office as personally unkind.
They were from among my most ardent political enemies,
from whom no faithful cooperation could ever be expected,
and laid me under the embarrassment of acting thro' men
whose views were to defeat mine; or to encounter the odium
of putting others in their places. It seemed but common jus-
tice to leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own
choice.'
Jefferson, alas, was denied such kindness and common justice,
and it was his attempt to achieve it that produced Marbury v.
Madison.2
The constitutional flaw that gave rise to Marbury persists
even as we celebrate the decision's two hundredth birthday.
Marbury established a principle of judicial review which courts
have applied without hesitation ever since then.' Marbury - that
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to the University of Minne-
sota for affording me the opportunity to participate in this birthday party. Dinah
Sampson provided excellent research assistance.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, in 1 THE
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 270 (Lester Cappon ed., 1959). Jefferson added that "after
brooding over it for some little time... I forgave it cordially, and returned to the same
state of esteem and respect for him which had so long subsisted." Id. at 270-71.
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Academics are another story. As then-Professor McConnell testified at his re-
cent judicial confirmation hearing, "In my line of work, we're still arguing about Marbury
v. Madison." See Jonathan Groner, Law Scholars Lift McConnell's Chances: Professors
Rally Around One of Their Own, Muting Liberal Opposition to Outspoken 10th Circuit
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is, William Marbury, the erstwhile justice of the peace and un-
successful plaintiff-suffered a different fate. On his next to last
day in office, President Adams selected Marbury to serve in an
office that Congress had created only three days before. The
Senate quickly gave its consent and Secretary of State John Mar-
shall sealed the commission, but Marshall neglected to deliver
the commission before the clock tolled midnight on March 3,
thus ending the Adams Administration. Marbury was legally en-
titled to his office, said Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury,
but the statute by which Marbury asked the Court to act was un-
constitutional. Marbury lost, but Marbury lived on.
None of this would have happened, of course, if President
Adams and his Federalist Party allies in Congress had not been
in such a hurry to create and populate an expanded federal judi-
ciary. And Adams and the Federalists would not have been in
such a hurry if Adams had been reelected in 1800. But Jefferson
and the dreaded Republicans were the victors, and they were
poised to take office on March 4, 1801. The months between the
election and the inauguration-the so-called "lame duck" pe-
riod-thus provided the last opportunity for the Federalists to
exercise the authority of the government of the United States.
They made the most of the opportunity. In the understated
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "The lame-duck Congress...
proceeded to use its political power with considerable aban-
don."4 Between December 1800 and March 3, 1801, President
Adams and the Federalist majority in Congress enacted sweep-
ing legislation, approved treaties, appointed a new Chief Justice
and dozens of other judges to the federal judiciary, and nearly
succeeded in anointing Aaron Burr as President instead of Tho-
mas Jefferson. The incoming Republicans were not amused, but
the Constitution left them helpless.5
Nearly 150 years passed before the Constitution was
amended in an effort to solve the lame duck problem. Pursuant
Nominee, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at 8 (quoting McConnell). The path by which
Chief Justice Marshall decided Marbury elicits the greatest skepticism, as many of the
other papers in this symposium demonstrate.
4. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 49 (1992).
5. The best histories of this episode are GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15
(1981), and DONALD 0. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL
BACKGROUND OF MARBURY V. MADISON (1970). Professor Haskins wrote the part of
volume two of the Oliver Wendall Holmes Devise History that addresses the issues re-
lated to Marbury.
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to the twentieth amendment, the newly-elected President now
takes office on January 20 instead of March 4, and the new Con-
gress begins on January 3 instead of when. The proponents of
the twentieth amendment believed that they had solved the lame
duck problem once and for all. But they were wrong. Lame duck
Presidents and Congresses have been busy enacting legislation,
promulgating regulations, approving treaties, pardoning crimi-
nals, and appointing judges and other officials. Their state execu-
tive and legislative counterparts do much the same thing.
This persists despite the early recognition that actions by
lame ducks present serious questions of democratic theory. Ech-
oes of those concerns sounded during the push to approve the
twentieth amendment during the 1920's and early 1930's. Most
recently, academics have responded to perceived abuses by lame
duck Presidents by proposing restrictions on the President's
powers during the lame duck period. I will join those calls in this
essay, hoping that we can learn the lesson of Marbury's ap-
pointment just as we have accepted Marbury. It is time to heed
Jefferson's plea for "common justice to leave a successor free to
act by instruments of his own choice."6
I. THE EVENTS OF THE LAME DUCK PERIOD OF 1800
TO 1801
A. THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
The timing of the actions of the lame duck President Adams
and the Federalist-controlled Congress in 1800 and 1801 speaks
for itself:
November 17 The second session of the Sixth Congress began
December 15 Adams learned of the resignation of Chief Jus-
tice Oliver Ellsworth
December 18 Adams nominated John Jay to serve as Chief
Justice
December 19 The Senate confirmed John Jay to serve as
Chief Justice
January 2 Jay wrote to Adams declining to serve as Chief
Justice
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, supra note 1.
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January 20 Adams nominated John Marshall to serve as
Chief Justice
House passed the Judiciary Act
January 23 Senate rejected the Treaty with France
January 27 Senate confirmed Marshall as Chief Justice
February 3 Senate ratified the Treaty with France
February 4 Marshall took the oath of office as Chief Justice
February 5 Senate passed the District of Columbia courts
act
February 11 Senate passed the Judiciary Act
February 13 Adams signed the Judiciary Act
February 17 House elected Thomas Jefferson as President
February 18 Adams submitted nominations for most of the
circuit judges to fill the positions created by the
Judiciary Act
February 20 Senate confirmed the judges nominated two
days before
February 23 Adams submitted nominations for five addi-
tional circuit judges and other offices created
by the Judiciary Act
February 24 Senate confirmed the judges nominated the day
before House passed the District of Columbia
courts act
February 25 Adams submitted nominations for two addi-
tional circuit judges created by the Judiciary
Act
February 26 Senate confirmed the judges nominated the day
before
February 27 Adams signed the District of Columbia courts
act
February 28 Adams submitted nominations for three judges,
the district attorney, and the federal marshal
established by the District of Columbia courts
act
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March 2 Adams nominated William Marbury and 41
others to serve as justices of the peace pursuant
to the District of Columbia courts act
Senate confirmed the last of the judges nomi-
nated on February 26
March 3 Senate confirmed the appointment of Marbury
and the others nominated the day before
March 4 Thomas Jefferson inaugurated as President
The Federalist Party controlled the presidency and the
Congress for the first twelve years of government under the new
Constitution of the United States. George Washington served
two terms as President, then John Adams took office in 1796.
The Federalists also controlled the Congress. During that time,
though, President Washington's leadership covered an increas-
ingly divisive disagreement between Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson concerning the direction of the federal gov-
ernment. Hamilton and his allies came to be known as the Fed-
eralist Party, while Jefferson was the acknowledged leader of the
Republican Party. The election of 1800 thus presented a stark
choice regarding the future direction of the young United States.
But the choice was not simply between the Federalists and Jef-
ferson. John Adams had steered a middle course during his term
as President, frustrating ardent Federalists and Jeffersonian Re-
publicans alike. Adams remained a Federalist, though, so he and
Jefferson competed for the presidency in 1800.
7
Jefferson defeated Adams by eight electoral votes-73-65-
making it one of the closest presidential races in American his-
tory. Adams would have prevailed if he had won New York,
which went for Jefferson by a mere 250 votes.' Meanwhile, the
Federalists lost control of Congress as well. By December 12,
then, it was clear that twelve years of Federalist rule had ended.
What was not known, of course, is that "[tihe Federalists were
7. See generally HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 50-73 (summarizing
American politics at the time of the election of 1800).
8. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 556 (2001). McCullough notes the
irony "that Jefferson, the apostle of agrarian America who loathed cities, owed his ulti-
mate political triumph to New York." Id. Moreover, Jefferson would have lost but for
the electoral votes he won in the southern states, and those electoral votes were calcu-
lated by counting each slave as three-fifths of a person in counting the total state popula-
tion. See id.
2003]
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never to regain power in the executive and legislative branches
after the loss of the election of 1800."9
Nearly three months remained after Adams learned that he
would not serve another term until Jefferson would actually suc-
ceed him. Three important events occurred during that lame-
duck period: the Treaty with France was approved, the House of
Representatives selected Jefferson as President, and the federal
judiciary was expanded and populated. The latter event receives
most of the attention when the actions of lame-ducks are cri-
tiqued, but the importance of the first two events should not be
underestimated.
1. The Treaty with France
The Sixth Congress began its lame duck session in Decem-
ber 1800. It did little until January 1801, when the Senate began
a month of debate concerning the treaty that the Adams admini-
stration had negotiated with France. President Adams had
named Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and Wil-
liam Vans Murray to negotiate an end to ongoing disputes with
France, a move that the Senate confirmed in February 1799
"over High Federalist objections."1 Those negotiations yielded
an agreement signed at M6rtefontaine in early October 1800.
The Senate considered the treaty as the first measure of serious
business during its lame-duck session following the election of
1800. But "[h]aving lost his bid for reelection, Adams had even
less influence than usual with the High Federalists," and the
Senate defeated the treaty 16-14 on January 23, with all of the
negative votes cast by Federalists." As Jean Edward Smith ex-
plains:
The fact is, the party had thrown a temper tantrum-a
splenetic outburst of resentment against Adams, against
France, against the impending loss of power that the election
had made inevitable. Reality dawned quickly. To the discom-
fiture of Federalist senators, the Convention of M6rtefontaine
was extremely popular throughout the country, not only
among Jefferson's supporters but also with the business com-
munity, which wanted the quasi-war to end so that trade
could be restored with France. Marshall and others pointed
out that if the party did not back Adams and adopt the treaty,
9. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 72.
10. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 252 n.t
(1996).
11. Id. at 278.
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the incoming Jefferson administration would negotiate a new
one that they would find even more objectionable. 2
These arguments persuaded five of the original Senate oppo-
nents of the treaty to change their minds, and the Senate ratified
the resubmitted treaty 22-9 on February 3.
2. The selection of Jefferson as President
The next task for the lame duck Congress was to choose a
President. Jefferson had received eight more electoral votes than
Adams, but he had received the same number of votes as Aaron
Burr-Jefferson's running mate. Everyone knew that Jefferson
was the presidential candidate and Burr was the candidate for
Vice President, but the Constitution neglected to account for
that. 3 But "[t]he lame-duck House of Representatives was con-
trolled by the Federalists, and for many of them, Jefferson was
anathema."' 4 So the Federalists in the House moved to select
Burr, not Jefferson, as President-"public sentiment to the con-
trary notwithstanding."' 5 For thirty-five ballots, the Republicans
voted for Jefferson and the Federalists voted for Burr, leaving
Jefferson one state short of the majority that he needed to be
elected President. Finally, Jefferson prevailed when James
Bayard, a Federalist from Delaware, abstained from voting for
Burr on February 17.16
3. The expansion of the federal judiciary
President Adams received his first lame duck opportunity to
shape the future of the federal judiciary in December 1800.
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth resigned because of ill health, 7
and John Jay declined Adams' nomination to reprise in that po-
sition. So Adams turned to John Marshall, who had been serving
as his Secretary of State. Marshall was ready, willing, and able,
and "Adams simply could not afford to delay naming a Chief
Justice if the Federalists were to retain control of the Court."' 8
12. Id.
13. A constitutional amendment soon remedied that problem. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XII (1804).
14. SMITH, supra note 10, at 10.
15. Id.
16. For an account of Jefferson's election from Bayard's perspective, see MORTON
BORDEN, THE FEDERALISM OF JAMES A. BAYARD 88-95 (1955).
17. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 103 n.158 (noting that Adams re-
ceived the resignation letter on December 15, 1800).
18. SMITH, supra note 10, at 15.
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The Federalists in the Senate were less than impressed by the
choice, for they viewed Marshall as insufficiently committed to
Hamiltonian principles. Indeed, one Federalist Senator reported
"that Marshall's nomination was greeted 'with grief, astonish-
ment, and almost indignation.""' 9 Adams, however, refused to
budge during a week of Federalist pleas to choose a more ac-
ceptable candidate. Then the Federalists recognized that the al-
ternative to Marshall was leaving the seat vacant for President
Jefferson to fill. The Senate unanimously confirmed Marshall on
January 27, with the Republicans supporting Marshall enthusias-
tically.20
Meanwhile, the lame duck Congress that began meeting in
December enacted 37 statutes before it adjourned on March 3,
with most of them addressing minor issues that generated little
controversy.2' Two of those statutes stand out. In the middle of
December 1800, Jefferson wrote James Madison that Congress
would not act on a judiciary bill during the lame duck session be-
cause the judicial appointments "could not fall on those that cre-
ate them. '22 At the time, the federal judiciary consisted of just
twelve men: the six Justices of the Supreme Court and six circuit
judges. Congress had considered numerous reform proposals
since the early 1790's. Most recently, the House had narrowly
defeated a federal judiciary bill in the spring of 1800, but it failed
to heed the pleas of its supporters-including John Marshall,
who was then serving on the House Judiciary Committee-and
the issue remained unresolved before the election.23 But contrary
to Jefferson's confidence, the election prompted the Federalists
in Congress to return to the future of the federal judiciary with a
new urgency. The bill developed by Congress greatly expanded
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It relieved the Supreme
Court Justices from the duty to ride on circuit to hear cases
throughout the country, and it reduced the number of Justices
from six to five in a transparent move to deny Jefferson an ap-
19. Id. (quoting New Jersey Senator Jonathan Dayton). Professor Dewey explains
that "Marshall's greatest affront to pure Federalism came during his congressional cam-
paign of 1799 when he criticized the Alien and Sedition Acts." DEWEY, supra note 5, at
9.
20. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. Professor Dewey is somewhat more cautious,
characterizing the Republicans as "indifferent to Marshall's appointment." DEWEY, su-
pra note 5, at 13.
21. See generally 2 Stat. 88-127 (recording each of the statutes).
22. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 19, 1800, in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 159 (P.L. Ford ed., 1904-05).
23. See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. &
MARY Q. 3, 9-14 (1965).
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pointment once the next justice retired. The bill also created six-
teen new federal circuit judgeships, along with numerous atten-
dant clerks, United States marshals, and United States attorneys.
The House approved the bill 51-43 on the same day that the
Senate confirmed John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice.
A little over two weeks later, on February 11, the Senate con-
curred 16-11. No Republicans voted for the bill. 4 George Ma-
son, a Republican Senator from Virginia, complained that the
bill "has been crammed down our throats without a word or let-
ter being suffered to be altered."'
President Adams immediately set out to fill the positions
created by the new law. He was assisted by John Marshall (now
serving as both Chief Justice and Secretary of State), innumer-
able Federalist partisans, and prospective officeholders them-
selves. Adams nominated the first judges on February 18, five
days after he had signed the law that created the judgeships. 6
The rest of the appointments soon followed. As noted by
Jeremiah Smith, a successful candidate for a federal judgship in
New Hampshire, "There is something awkward in applying...
for an office before it is created."27 Jefferson and the Republi-
cans complained about the rush to fill the judiciary with Federal-
ists. But the Republicans in the Senate affirmatively opposed
only one judicial nomination. Philip Barton Key had lost his seat
in the Maryland state legislature in the election of 1800, so
President Adams selected him to fill a new judgeship on the
Fourth Circuit. Key, however, had fought as a Loyalist and
briefly returned to England after the Revolutionary War. Nine
Republican Senators unsuccessfully opposed his appointment to
the court.28
Just over two weeks remained. Adams continued to submit
nominations to the Senate, filling a total of 106 military positions
and 18 diplomatic and commercial posts in February 1801, in ad-
24. See An Act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of
the United States, 2 Stat. 89 (1801); 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 915 (1801) (recording the
House vote). Three Federalists joined all of the Republican members of the House in
opposing the bill. See Turner, supra note 23, at 19 n.83.
25. Letter from George Mason to John Breckenridge, Feb. 12, 1801, contained in
the Breckenridge Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, quoted in HASKINS
& JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 126 n.82).
26. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 381-85; Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 498 (1961). Professor Turner's article offers a detailed account of
the selection of all of the judges whose positions were created by the Judiciary Act.
27. Turner, supra note 26, at 497 (quoting a letter from Smith to Senator Jonathan
Dayton dated Jan. 30, 1801).
28. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 383; Turner, supra note 26, at 513-14 & n.124.
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dition to the judgeships established by the Judiciary Act.29 Then,
on February 27, Congress passed the innocently-titled "Act con-
cerning the District of Columbia., 31 Washington had become the
nation's capital in 1800 when the government moved from
Philadelphia.3' Accordingly, the February 27 statute created
three more judges, and authorized the appointment of an inde-
terminate number of clerks, United States Marshals, and United
States Attorneys, and "such number of discreet persons to be
justices of the peace as the President of the United States shall
from time to time think expedient., 32 Acting quickly, Adams
moved to fill the new positions, failing only once when his nomi-
nee declined to serve due to poor health.33 He appointed the
three new judges established by the District of Columbia courts
act.34 He also appointed 53 individuals to other positions estab-
lished by that act, including William Marbury, who was chosen
to serve a five year term as a justice of the peace.35 The Senate
approved all of the nominations on March 3, including a final
meeting that began at six o'clock on that evening.36 The commis-
sions were sent to the Secretary of State-John Marshall-who
quickly affixed the seal of the United States and moved to de-
liver them to the new appointees. But, according to Jeffersonian
legend, Marshall had not completed the task when Levi Lin-
coln-Jefferson's choice as Attorney General-walked into
Marshall's office holding Jefferson's watch at midnight. 7 Mar-
bury's commission was one of several that had been sealed but
not delivered. Jefferson declined to allow Marbury to take of-
fice, so Marbury sued in the Supreme Court. He lost.
29. See DEWEY, supra note 5, at 55.
30. An Act concerning the District of Columbia, 2 Stat. 103 (1801) [hereinafter Dis-
trict of Columbia Courts Act].
31. On November 1, 1800, John Adams became the first President to occupy the
White House, See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 551.
32. District of Columbia Courts Act, 2 Stat. 103, § 11.
33. See Turner, supra note 26, at 517-18.
34. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 387 (1801).
35. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 388 (1801) (listing the nomination of "William
Marberry"); see generally David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and Wil-
liam Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 349 (1996) (de-
scribing William Marbury's life and career).
36. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 389-90 (1801).
37. As Dewey recounts the Jeffersonian legend, Levi Lincoln "stormed in to order
Marshall to stop immediately. When they quibbled over time, the attorney general deliv-
ered his first legal opinion-to the chief justice, of all people-by ruling that the Presi-
dent's timepiece, which he held in his hand, was the final authority. The humiliated Mar-
shall then supposedly slunk from the office, leaving a pile of commissions on his desk,
including the ill-fated one for William Marbury." DEWEY, supra note 5, at 58.
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Marbury was not the only lame-duck appointee to lose his
position once Jefferson took office. In the words of one biogra-
pher, after the election, and
[w]ith grim determination, Jefferson set about the tedious
task of weeding out the "midnight" appointments. He care-
fully defined them as those which had been "made by mr Ad-
ams after Dec. 12. 1800 when the event of the S.C. election
which decided the Presidential election was known at Wash-
ington and until Midnight of Mar. 3, 1801." These were to be
"considered as Null.",38
Many of those appointments were to offices within the executive
branch, and thus within Jefferson's power to remove. Thus Jef-
ferson vowed to "expunge the effects of Mr. A.'s indecent con-
duct, in crowding nominations after he knew they were not for
himself, till 9 o'clock of the night, at 12. o'clock of which he was
to go out of office., 39 The judicial appointments were protected
by the life-tenure provision of Article III, but the Republicans
had a solution for that, too. In 1802, Congress repealed that stat-
ute, largely because of the circumstances of its enactment.L4 One
week after deciding Marbury, the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Paterson, sustained the repeal of the Judiciary
Act.41
B. THE REASONS FOR THE LAME DUCK ACTIONS
Most of the Jeffersonian and Republican complaints about
the actions of the lame duck Federalists were based on the proc-
ess, not the merits of the particular decisions. Indeed, the merits
are eminently defensible, certainly concerning John Marshall's
appointment as Chief Justice, and even with respect to the ill-
fated Judiciary Act. "Had the appointment of these officers been
left to Jefferson," one historian concluded, "the Republicans
would undoubtedly have found little fault with the law., 42 Like-
wise, many of those individuals who were then appointed to the
38. 2 NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 670-71 (1951)
(quoting Jefferson).
39. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush, Mar. 24, 1801, in 9
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 230-31.
40. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 163-68 (describing the repeal of the
Judiciary Act of 1801).
41. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
42. 2 J.B. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 533
(1885) (quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 108). See also DEWEY, supra
note 5, at 54 ("The Judiciary Act of 1801 was a commendable piece of legislation though
abominably timed.").
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new judgeships and other positions were highly regarded by Re-
publicans at the time and historians since then.43
But that does not mean that the actions of the lame duck
Federalists were justified. The people had just elected Jefferson
as President accompanied by a Republican majority in Congress,
and the successful candidates rejected the Federalist conception
of the federal judiciary. Surveying these events with the benefit
of hindsight, Professor Kathryn Turner concluded that "[t]he
Judiciary Act of 1801 ... was not conceived in the exigencies of
defeat to compensate for that catastrophe."' But it is the timing
of the law's birth, not its conception, that is so troublesome. The
compelling reasons for that legislation were equally compelling
when the same Congress rejected it nearly a year before. The
haste with which Congress approved a nearly identical statute in
February 1801 is explained by only one thing.
Republicans complained that "[i]n all these instances
[President Adams] named men opposed in political opinion to
the national will, as unequivocally declared by his removal and
the appointment of a successor of different sentiments."'45 Adams
and the Federalists were accused of "pack[ing] the judiciary...
without even a feeling of shame that he was appointing men to
office for life whose principles had just been condemned by the
people."46 The Philadelphia Aurora proclaimed that the Judici-
ary Act "might with greater propriety be called a bill for provid-
ing sinecure places and pensions for thorough-going Federal par-
tisans."47 John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice failed to
elicit a similar outrage, perhaps because of genuine Republican
acceptance of Marshall, or perhaps because they "accept[ed] the
appointment of a chief justice by a retiring President as one of
the unfortunate rules of the game of politics."' But it would
43. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 131 (concluding that "[a]lthough the
political character of the appointments requires no documentation, most of them were
deserving men of proven ability at the Bar or on the bench"); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
761 (1951) (contending that "Adams chose an extraordinarily able group of men" who
"will bear comparison with any equal number of judges ever chosen by any President,
before or since"); Turner, supra note 26, at 519-21 (evaluating the appointments).
44. Turner, supra note 23, at 32.
45. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1801, quoted in Turner, supra note 26, at
519.
46. L.G. TYLER, PARTIES AND PATRONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 23-24 (1891)
(quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 109 n.6).
47. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 55 (quoting the PHILADELPHIA AURORA).
48. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 13; see also id. at 14 (noting that "Republican and Fed-
eralist newspapers alike virtually ignored Marshall's assumption of office .... perhaps
because 'sinecure' then seemed a fair description of the office.").
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have been unthinkable for Thomas Jefferson to appoint his
archenemy to the Supreme Court.49
Jefferson was particularly upset with the appointments. As
noted above, he described the lame duck appointments "as per-
sonally unkind," adding that "[i]t seemed but common justice to
leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own choice."0
Again as noted above, he protested "Mr. A.'s indecent conduct,
in crowding nominations after he knew they were not for him-
self, till 9 o'clock of the night, at 12. o'clock of which he was to
go out of office."51 Jefferson also complained that the creation
and appointment of new judges were the most objectionable ac-
tions of the lame duck Federalists "because appointments in the
nature of freehold render it difficult to undo what is done., 52 He
famously complained that the Federalists "have retired into the
judiciary as a stronghold" from whence "all the works of repub-
licanism are to be beaten down and erased. 53
The Federalists admitted as much. A desire to save the na-
tion from itself operated as the animating principle throughout
the lame duck period. Henry Adams later referred to the Feder-
alist effort "to prevent the overthrow of those legal principles in
which, as they believed, national safety dwelt."5 William Bing-
ham, a Federalist Senator from Pennsylvania, explained that the
Judiciary Act must be approved quickly because "the federal
Party wish the appointments to be made under the present ad-
ministration ... the Importance of filling these Seats with federal
characters must be obvious., 55 Senator Dwight Foster of Massa-
chusetts simply observed that if the Judiciary Act "now passes
49. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 11-12 (describing the life-long animosity between
Jefferson and Marshall); DEWEY, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that "John Marshall and
Thomas Jefferson despised each other"); 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 192 (1930) (describing
Marshall as "a man as obnoxious to Jefferson as the bitterest New England Calvinist
could have been"). Indeed, Jefferson's attitude toward Marshall was once characterized
as "tinged with a deeper feeling, bordering at times on fear." SMITH, supra note 10, at 12
(quoting Henry Adams).
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, supra note 1.
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush, Mar. 24, 1801, in 9
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 230-31.
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 26, 1800, in THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 161.
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801, in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Memorial ed., 1902).
54. 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 275 (1889),
quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 109.
55. Turner, supra note 26, at 509 (quoting a letter from Bingham to Richard Peters
dated February 1, 1801).
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Mr. Adams will have the nomination of the Judges to be ap-
pointed., 56 Another Federalist warned of "scoundrels placed on
the seat of Justice" once "the ground will be occupied by the en-
emy the very next Session of Congress. 5 7 Even President Ad-
ams acknowledged the divergence between his views and those
expressed during the recent election. Responding to Federalists
who championed judicial candidates who were "an enemy to the
fatal philosophy of the day, Adams wrote that such a view "has
great weight with me, although it appears to have none with our
nation."58 Thus the Judiciary Act was "as good to the party as an
election."'5 9
The good of friends, family, and individual Federalists offers
an even more banal explanation for these actions. According to
Professor Turner, several leading Federalists in Congress had
"purchased lands on a vast scale," and as "their anticipated for-
tunes hung in the balance in 1800 jeopardized by state action,"
the Judiciary Act's expansion of federal court jurisdiction af-
forded them some comfort.6° Moreover, many of the judges and
other officials appointed by President Adams and confirmed by
the Senate were relatives of those involved in making the ap-
pointments (and, of course, in creating the offices to which they
were appointed). "Impervious now to criticism," and casting
aside his earlier scruples, President Adams appointed his
nephew, William Cranch, as one of the new judges for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.6' John Marshall's brother James received one
of the other District of Columbia judgeships.62 William McClung
was appointed to the new Sixth Circuit judgeship, which un-
doubtedly pleased two of his brothers-in-law: John Marshall and
56. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 53 (quoting Senator Foster).
57. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 128 (quoting a letter from J. Gunn to
Alexander Hamilton dated December 13, 1800).
58. Turner, supra note 26, at 503 (quoting a letter from Adams to John Rodgers
dated Feb. 6, 1801).
59. Turner, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting a Republican's recollection of a Federalist
boast).
60. Turner, supra note 23, at 28-29. Professor Turner stresses that "[ilt would be a
mistake, however, to view the Judiciary Act of 1801 solely in terms of its benefits to the
speculative interests of Federalist members of Congress." Id. at 29.
61. Turner, supra note 26, at 517-18. David McCullough describes how Adams,
when serving as Vice President, rebuffed Mercy Warren's request to arrange for a posi-
tion for her husband because he "could not possibly allow the authority entrusted to him
to become 'subservient to my private views, or those of my family or friends."'
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 411. But during the lame duck period of 1801, Adams
"excercis[ed] his presidential prerogative to fill government positions of all kinds, includ-
ing some for friends and needy relatives. Scruples of the kind he had once preached to
Mercy Warren concerning such appointments were considered no more." Id. at 563.
62 See Turner, supra note 26, at 518.
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Kentucky Senator Humphrey Marshall.6 Keith Taylor, another
brother-in-law of John Marshall, was appointed as Fourth Cir-
cuit judge.' The new Third Circuit judge, Richard Bassett, was
the father-in-law of James Bayard, a leading Federalist member
of the House. 6' Edward St. Loe Livermore, the new federal dis-
trict attorney for New Hampshire, was the son of Senator Sam-
uel Livermore.66 As for friends, the balance of the appointments
were loyal Federalists, including defeated politicians and a dis-
graced cabinet official. President Adams also appointed four
members of Congress to newly created positions that had just
become vacant when their previous occupants were elevated to
higher offices, a clever but controversial evasion of the constitu-
tional ban on appointing sitting members of Congress to offices
that they helped to establish.67
11. LAME DUCKS SINCE MARBURY
The Federalists of 1801 began an American tradition of ex-
ploiting the lame duck period. The complaints voiced by the Re-
publicans of 1801 have been frequently echoed as well. 68 Con-
cerns about legislation approved by lame duck Congresses
culminated in the enactment of the twentieth amendment in
1933. Popularly known as "the lame duck amendment," the
twentieth amendment responded to concerns that governmental
actions taken by lame ducks are fundamentally undemocratic:
The supporters of the Twentieth Amendment proclaimed that
the voice of the people in an election was supreme. That
proposition demanded that the electoral mandate of the peo-
ple should be put into effect immediately. New members of
63. Id. at 516-18.
64. Id. at 513-14.
65. Id. at 512-13.
66. Id. at 497-98.
67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing that "[n]o Senator or Representative shall,
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Au-
thority of the United States, which shall have been created.., during such time");
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 131-32 & n.121 (listing the members of Congress
who were named judges). The argument for the constitutionality of such maneuvers em-
phasized that members of Congress were appointed to positions that had existed before
the appointee served in Congress.
68. What happened to lame ducks before 1801 is of keen interest to me, but I have
yet to pursue the historical research necessary to answer that question. One obvious
point is that the lame duck period is much shorter under a Parliamentary system in which
the transition from the defeated government to the victors can take place within a matter
of days, not months. Still, there were lame ducks before 1801, and their actions are de-
serving of future scrutiny.
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Congress should take their seats soon after the election. Out-
going members of Congress who lost their bids for reelection
were characterized as no longer representative of the people
and no longer entitled to participate in legislative actions. In-
deed, one of the more restrained supporters of the Amend-
ment argued that "for a person to continue to represent a
constituency after his defeat, is contrary to the whole plan and
philosophy of a representative system of government.,
69
Additionally, "[1]ame-duck members of Congress suffered from
perverse incentives. On the one hand, once defeated, members
were unaccountable to the electorate. On the other hand, outgo-
ing members were viewed as susceptible to pressure from the
President and from special interests. Many feared that the desire
to obtain new employment once service in Congress ended-
voluntarily or involuntarily-would influence the votes of an
outgoing Senator or Representative."7 Ratification of the twen-
tieth amendment was universally expected to end the possibility
of legislation being enacted by a lame duck Congress.7"
Yet the twentieth amendment failed to achieve its stated
goal of eliminating all lame duck legislation forever more. By
1940, a lame duck Congress returned to action, approving new
statutes with little apparent popular objection. The election of
1980 yielded the only post-twentieth amendment, Marbury-like
switch in both the party that controls the presidency and the
Senate. The lame ducks of 1980 succeeded in enacting legislation
imposing liability for the cleanup of hazardous wastes, the man-
agement of Alaska lands, and to address numerous other topics.
Since then, lame duck Congresses have approved NAFTA in
1994, impeached President Clinton in 1998, and created the De-
partment of Homeland Security in 2002.72
No constitutional change has ever addressed the power of
the President to act during a lame duck period. Unconstrained,
lame duck Presidents have entered into binding international ob-
ligations, such as the Algiers Declarations that secured the re-
lease of the Iranian hostages moments before President Carter
69. John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
470,480-81 (1997) (quoting Representative Sumners).
70. Id. at 479.
71. Id. at 477-78.
72. See id at 490-93 (describing the actions of lame duck Congresses in 1980 and
1994); RICHARD S. BETH & RICHARD C. SACHS, LAME DUCK SESSIONS, 74TH-106TH
CONGRESS (1935-2000) (2000) (Congressional Research Service report summarizing the
history of lame duck congressional sessions from 1935 to 2000).
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was succeeded by President Reagan in January 1981."3 They
have also issued controversial pardons, including President
Bush's December 1992 decision to pardon former Secretary of
Defense Casper Weinberger shortly before Weinberger faced
trial for actions related to the Iran-Contra affair. 4 Since the en-
actment of the twentieth amendment, it appears that only one
federal judge has been nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate in the lame duck period beginning with
election day and ending with the inauguration of the new Presi-
dent. Stephen Breyer had been serving as the Democratic major-
ity counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee when the No-
vember 1980 election produced a Republican President and a
new Republican majority in the Senate. A few days later, Presi-
dent Carter nominated Breyer to a position on the First Circuit,
which the Senate confirmed with little opposition.75
President Clinton was constitutionally barred from seeking
reelection in 2000, but he kept busy throughout his lame duck
period. He signed the treaty establishing an international crimi-
nal court, an action that Senator Helms decried as a "blatant at-
tempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands of his succes-
sor."76 He employed his powers under the Antiquities Act to
designate six new national monuments comprising over 600,000
acres of land, thrilling environmentalists but sometimes infuriat-
ing local officials.77 The Clinton Administration also issued a
73. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomenc" Presidential Transi-
tions and International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303 (2001). Combs, besides recounting the
resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, provides an excellent description of the actions of
other lame-duck Presidents before then. See id. at 329-36.
74. See Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 HouS. L. REV. 883
(1992).
75. Three other judicial nominations come close to, but outside of, my description
of the lame duck appointment of judges. In June 1968, President Johnson nominated Jus-
tice Fortas to serve as Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Johnson had decided not to run for reelection, but the election of his successor had yet to
take place. In any event, the Senate refused to confirm Fortas. In December 2000, Presi-
dent Clinton made a recess appointment of Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit. That
appointment would have expired after one year, but Judge Gregory was one of President
Bush's first group of judicial nominees in May 2001, and the Senate approved that ap-
pointment soon thereafter. Most recently, the Senate confirmed Michael McConnell's
nomination to the Tenth Circuit during its November 2002 lame duck session, but Presi-
dent Bush had nominated McConnell long before the lame duck session occurred.
76. Ruth Wedgwood, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The
Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 196 (2001) (quoting Senator
Helms). See also Combs, supra note 73, at 429 (explaining that President Clinton could
not defer a decision about the treaty because it "was open for signature without prior
ratification only until December 31, 2001").
77. See Sanjay Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Eco-
systems with the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 537 (2001) (listing the
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number of other controversial environmental regulations, in-
cluding several promulgated on its last day in office. For exam-
ple, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a new rule re-
ducing the permitted level of arsenic in drinking water.78 That
common sense action had been debated for well over a decade,
but it had been protested by western states with high naturally
occurring levels of arsenic that would necessitate extensive and
purportedly unnecessary municipal expenditures. After years of
political wrangling but no changes, in the summer of 2000 the
Clinton Administration proposed that the arsenic standard be
changed to 5 parts per billion (ppb). That proposal elicited howls
of protest from communities that would incur substantial costs to
meet new standards. Albuquerque, with an average arsenic level
of 13 ppb, was the largest city that would violate the proposed
standards, and city officials, led by Democratic Mayor Jim Baca,
were outspoken in their opposition to the suggested changes.
Vice President Gore was conspicuously silent about the pending
new arsenic regulations during the summer's presidential cam-
paign, a sharp contrast to his claim four years before that Repub-
licans in Congress were in favor of more arsenic. Gore won New
Mexico by 366 votes, the closest vote of any state in the nation.
Only after the election was settled, and just before it left office,
did the Clinton Administration settle on a 10 ppb standard for
arsenic in drinking water. The Bush Administration soon an-
nounced that it would revisit the rule, a decision which gener-
ated lots of unfavorable publicity for the environmental creden-
tials of the new president, who soon decided to maintain the
standard adopted at the end of the Clinton Administration.
President Clinton also issued a number of controversial
pardons in his last days in office. As Greg Sisk has recounted, in
January 2001 a lame duck Clinton granted pardons to his
brother, a participant in the Whitewater scandal, a wealthy busi-
nessman who was facing a new federal criminal investigation,
and a cocaine dealer whose father was a major contributor to the
Democratic party. Clinton granted executive clemency to
Patricia Hearst and two members of the Weather Underground,
not realizing of course the terrible prominence that domestic ter-
rorism would gain eight months later. Clinton's most controver-
new monuments); see also id. at 575 (citing national monuments established by lame
duck Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, and Dwight Eisenhower).
78. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, Part VIII, 66 Fed. Reg. 6,976
(2001).
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sial pardon went to Marc Rich, a "billionaire fugitive" and "an
accused black marketeer who traded with the enemy-an act of
treason."79 The insider's account of the pardons reveals much the
same frenzy of activity that resulted in the appointment of Wil-
liam Marburyo and the infamous Midnight Judges exactly 200
years before. 0
The lame duck problem occurs in the states, too. One of the
most dramatic examples of that occurred on the eve of Mar-
bury's two hundredth birthday, when Illinois Governor Ryan
gained international attention for pardoning four death row in-
mates and commuting the death sentences of the other 164 pris-
oners awaiting capital punishment in the state. The merits of that
decision provoked widespread commentary tracking the na-
tional-and international-debate about the wisdom and just
application of the death penalty. But the timing of Governor
Ryan's actions caused concern independent of the merits of the
more general debate regarding capital punishment. Ryan acted
on January 11, 2003, just two days before Rod Blagojevich would
replace him as governor. Blagojevich characterized Ryan's ac-
tions as "a big mistake."'" Peter Roskam, a Republican state
senator who had been pushing for legislative reforms of capital
punishment, worried that "[t]he desire to reform the system will
be dulled" by Ryan's actions.' The Chicago Tribune agreed,
having editorialized that Ryan would "vastly undermine his own
reform efforts" by issuing a blanket commutation in his last days
in office.83 But the Tribune had also written one day before
Ryan's action that "it would not be surprisinE if Ryan reaches
for the most dramatic statement he can make."
79. Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presi-
dential Term, 67 Mo. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2002).
80. See President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons: Hearing Before the Senate Judi-
ciary Comm., 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (2001) (testimony of Eric M. Holder, Jr., former
Deputy Attorney General) (describing how "extremely busy" the last day of the Clinton
Administration was in the Justice Department). Even so, the timing of Clinton's actions
are not as troubling as the handiwork of John Adams. Clinton was constitutionally
barred from seeking reelection; Adams ran and lost, providing unimpeachable evidence
of a popular rejection of him. Moreover, Al Gore-the candidate of the Democratic
Party that had previously nominated Clinton-received more popular votes in defeat
than did the winner, George W. Bush. The popular rejection of John Adams was thus
more convincing, but the problems attendant to lame ducks were seen in Clinton none-
theless.
81. Christi Parsons, Capital Justice Challenges Go to Hands of Others, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 12, 2003 at 17 (quoting Blagojevich).
82. Id. (quoting Senator Roskam).
83. Decision Time on Death Row, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2003, at 20.
84. Id.
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Within Illinois, Ryan's lame duck appointments provoked
unqualified outrage. Ryan had announced in August 2001 that
he would not seek reelection, presumably because he was impli-
cated in a patronage scandal involving his previous tenure as Il-
linois Secretary of State. Democrat Rod Blagojevich defeated
Republican Jim Ryan in the November 2002 election after both
candidates had worked to distance themselves from the incum-
bent governor. The Republicans lost their control of the state
senate as a result of the election as well. After the election, Gov-
ernor Ryan made over 200 appointments to various state offices.
Many of those appointments went to friends who had remained
loyal to him during his time in office. Those appointed included
Ryan's legal counsel and his communications chief, the es-
tranged wife of Ryan's former chief of staff, and Republican leg-
islators who had lost their bids for reelection. The offices thus
filled included positions on the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
the Chicago Transit Authority board, the Educational Labor
Board, the Illinois Industrial Commission, the Illinois Racing
Board, and the deputy commissioner to the Office of Banks and
Real Estate." Moreover, "[i]n a complicated maneuver repeated
dozens of times, some workers already in the middle of 4-year
appointments abruptly moved out of their terms and into new 4-
year terms during Ryan's final months in office. The new terms
were aimed at giving the workers job security deep into 2006-
well into the 4-year term the voters gave Blagojevich in Novem-
ber."86 Blagojevich and his supporters pleaded with Ryan not to
continue. As Blagojevich's spokesman explained, "we don't
want people serving in jobs when they are not in agreement with
the governor's new agenda to move the state forward."87 An-
other Democrat complained that "[w]e are tying the hands of the
future governor with too many appointees by a lame duck."88
The Chicago Tribune editorialized that Ryan had been "stuffing
nearly everyone who's ever said 'hello' to him into a high-paying
state job," making "personnel moves so shameless that prior
85. See Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Ryan Keeps Handing Out State Jobs; Blago-
jevich Considers Lawsuit as Governor Gives Shaw, Longtime Aide New Posts, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 7, 2003, at 1 (listing more than a dozen of the appointments).
86. John Chase & Ray Long, 28 Pals Fall in Job Purge; Blagojevich Risks Democ-
rats' Ire, CHI. TRIB, Jan. 28, 2003, Section 2 at 1.
87. Long & Parsons, supra note 85, at 1 (quoting Bagojevich spokesman Doug
Scofield).
88. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Ryan Has Parting Gifts for his Pals; Governor
Giving Jobs to Buddies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2002, at 1 (quoting Senator Vince De-
muzio).
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lame-duck governors look like saintly pillars of restraint."89 Ryan
responded simply that "there were vacancies there, and they
should be filled."9 Indeed: one position had been vacant for
over eight years.9 The state senate approved the nominations
with surprisingly little protest from Senate Democrats. Carol
Ronen of Chicago was the one Senator to speak against confirm-
ing Ryan's nominees, insisting that "[t]hese 11th-hour, last-
minute decisions by a lame-duck governor are going to impact
public policy and the budget of the state of Illinois years beyond
the term of our new governor-elect, and I think that's just plain
wrong." 92 Senator Ronen added that "[o]n Nov. 5, the voters of
Illinois clearly said they wanted change. What we are doing to-
day is not only in opposition to that change people wanted but is
the clear indication of why we need change."' As soon as he
took office, Governor Blagojevich rescinded more than sixty of
Ryan's appointments, but many of the appointments could not
be undone because they had been approved for specific terms in
office. And some Democrats in the Senate actually complained
about Blagojevich's actions.94
III. THE SOLUTION FOR LAME DUCKS
The problem revealed in each of these episodes is that the
actions of lame duck executives and legislators occur after the
electorate exercises its constitutional opportunity to ensure the
accountability of their government leaders.95 The solution must
be to deny or cabin those governmental powers that can tend to
be abused during lame duck periods. I will sketch a tentative ap-
proach to that solution in this essay, recognizing that much more
work remains to be done.
89. Ryan's Cronies-and Real Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 2003, at 16.
90. Long & Parsons, supra note 85, at 1 (quoting Ryan spokesman Ray Serati).
91. Id. (reporting that a former state legislator had accepted a top position in the
state Department of Natural Resources that had been vacant since 1994).
92. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Stop Buddy Plan, Ryan Asked; Blagojevich Says
Governor to Comply, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2002, at 1 (quoting Senator Ronen).
93. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, "Pate" Leaves Like a Good Soldier; Ryan is Re-
buffed on Office Deal to Aid Old Friend, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, at 1 (quoting Senator
Ronen).
94. See Chase & Long, supra note 86, at 1.
95. State court judges can be lame ducks, too, when their terms are about to expire
and their successors have been chosen. For an example of how decisionmaking by lame
duck judges can be controversial, see Chavez v. Hockenhull, 39 N.M. 79, 39 P.2d 1027
(1934) (resolving a disputed election to the United States Senate in favor of the Republi-
can candidate on the day before the Republican majority on the state supreme court
ended).
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The first task is to identify a lame duck. That proves more
difficult than one might initially suspect. At least four possible
definitions of a lame duck present themselves for consideration:
(1) a government official who cannot obtain an additional term;
(2) a government official who has publicly announced that he or
she will not seek an additional term; (3) a government official
who fails to win on election day; and (4) and a government offi-
cial whose successor has been formally chosen. Alternative one
is greatly overbroad for it would treat every official subject to
term limits as a lame duck once they reach their last constitu-
tionally permitted term. It would, for example, mean that every
governor of Virginia is always a lame duck, for state law prohib-
its a governor from serving more than one term.96 Alternative
two has some currency from popular usage.97 But it, too, is over-
broad, for it would render numerous officials lame ducks while
they have months or years left to serve. To cite one current ex-
ample, Georgia Senator Zell Miller's announcement that he will
not seek reelection made him a lame duck in this sense even
though his term extends for another 23 months. Alternative four,
by contrast, is too narrow insofar as it makes the characteriza-
tion of a lame duck depend upon the happenstance of a close
election or a constitutional formality even though the voters
have spoken. That leaves alternative three, which properly fo-
cuses upon both the voice of the electorate and the status of the
outgoing official. Ordinarily, then, a President becomes a lame
duck on the night of election day once it is apparent that he has
not been reelected. That was even true of President Clinton after
election day in November 2001, for we knew that he was not go-
ing to be reelected even though it took several weeks to resolve
the battle between George W. Bush and Al Gore. For President
Adams, the requisite date was probably December 12, when
word of Jefferson's victory over Adams in South Carolina pro-
vided Jefferson and Burr with sufficient electoral votes to doom
Adams's bid for reelection.98 Thus the historian who casually
96. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (2002).
97. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 215 (2002) (writing that
"[a] lame-duck Lyndon Johnson had nominated Abe Fortas" as Chief Justice in the
summer of 1968); Rick Pearson, Snowballing Scandal Blurs Ryan's Future; Some Already
Doubt a 2nd Term, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, Section 4 at 1 (reference to Governor Ryan
as lame duck nearly two years before his term ended).
98. As recounted above, Jefferson cited the December 12 date as dispositive be-
cause it was then that "the event of the S.C. election which decided the Presidential elec-
tion was known at Washington." 2 SCHACHNER, supra note 38, at 670-71 (quoting Jeffer-
son). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge, Dec. 18, 1800, in 9
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remarked that Adams was "not yet a lame duck" on November
22 was correct according to my understanding.99
This definition of a lame duck also furthers the accountabil-
ity that elections are designed to achieve. A candidate for reelec-
tion possesses a powerful incentive not to act in a manner that
offends the electorate. It is unlikely that any of the acts of Presi-
dent Adams or the lame duck Federalist Congress would have
changed the minds of many voters, though the closeness of the
election of 1800 counsels caution in simply assuming that is so.
More recent lame ducks better illustrate the accountability con-
cern. Stephen Carter, for example, observed that lame duck
President Bush's pardon of Casper Weinberger occurred after
Bush would "have faced the judgment of the American People
on his action."" President Clinton's pardons could have dam-
aged the candidacy of Al Gore, and the post-election environ-
mental regulations might have cost Gore New Mexico while af-
fecting local congressional races. Governor Ryan, by contrast,
was already oblivious to such electoral constraints because he
did not seem to care who succeeded him in office, or even about
public opinion itself.10'
However defined, lame ducks have their champions. During
the debate on the twentieth amendment, lame ducks were de-
fended "as worthy legislators even if the people had decided to
replace them.... Lame-duck members were also praised as in-
dependent from partisan and popular demands. They were seen
as deserving of the opportunity to finish their legislative agenda,
to counsel their replacements, and to make the transition back to
private life. The lame-duck period was glamorized as a necessary
cooling-off period during which electoral passions could sub-
side." ' 2 Seventy years later, Governor Ryan was characterized
as "refreshing" for his "blunt talk" about the perceived failures
of the state legislature, with one writer even remarking that its
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 157 (writing that "[blefore you
receive this, you will have understood that the State of S Carolina (the only one about
which there was uncertainty) has given a republican vote"); Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison, Dec. 19, 1800, in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 22, at 157-58 (writing that "[t]he election in S Carolina has in some measure decided
the great contest").
99. SMITH, supra note 10, at 277.
100. Carter, supra note 74, at 887.
101. See Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Illinois' Leadership Turns the Page; History-
and Federal Prosecutors- Will Write Final Chapter in How Ryan is Remembered, CHI.
TRIB, Jan. 13, 2003 (observing that "[a]s his political career disintegrated, Ryan gave up
worrying about how he was perceived by the voters who had soured on him").
102. Nagle, supra note 69, at 482.
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"[t]oo bad there's not some way that we could always have a
scandal-plagued, lame-duck political pariah in the governor's
mansion telling it like it is."" 3 Further, Paul Finkelman has sug-
gested that the lame duck period might be the "best time" for a
President to consider pardons because of the absence of political
pressures. 1 4 But all of these claims are deeply problematic. They
presume that accountability to the electorate is an obstacle to
desirable public policy, rather than its sine qua non. The Consti-
tution presumes that the regular exercise of the electoral fran-
chise by the people is central to self government. Defenses of
lame ducks thus deny "the end that government may be respon-
sive to the will of the people."'0 5
My proposal, then, is that lame ducks should be denied the
power to take any irrevocable acts. The issuance of pardons and
the signing of binding international obligations fall within this
category.' Likewise, lame duck Presidents and governors
should not be able to make appointments that cannot be unilat-
erally revoked by their successors. In Jefferson's words, that
power should be denied "because appointments in the nature of
freehold render it difficult to undo what is done."t °7 Judges serv-
ing with life tenure are the most obvious example, but agency
appointees who serve for specified terms and who cannot be re-
moved at will qualify as well. It is difficult to conceive of the ob-
jection to this approach. Any office that is already vacant on
election day can remain so-or can be filled by an acting offi-
cial-until the newly elected executive takes office. Any office
that becomes vacant after election day can await the new execu-
tive as well, save perhaps in the unimaginable circumstance of
multiple, important offices becoming vacant simultaneously."
Any office that itself is created during the lame duck period
103. Eric Zorn, News in June Offers Plenty of Ups and Downs, CHI. TRIB., June 29,
2002, at 16.
104. See Sisk, supra note 79, at 23-24 (quoting an e-mail from Professor Finkelman).
105. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
106. See Combs, supra note 73, at 331 & n.116 (citing cases in which "incoming gov-
ernors George Voinovich and Lamar Alexander, of Ohio and Tennessee, respectively,
filed lawsuits to invalidate their predecessors' lame-duck commutations of death sen-
tences, commutations that the states' voters vehemently opposed," but which the courts
upheld).
107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 26, 1800, in 9 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 161.
108. Cf. Paul Taylor, Alternatives to a Constitutional Amendment: How Congress
May Provide for the Quick, Temporary Filling of House Member Seats in Emergencies by
Statute, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 373 (2002).
THE LAME DUCKS OFMARBURY
must of course await the new executive, as Jefferson's plight so
vividly demonstrates.
That leaves a host of executive actions that can be revoked,
but only by the expenditure of substantial political capital. Ad-
ministrative regulations like the environmental rules approved
by President Clinton in January 2001 provide one good illustra-
tion, as the arsenic dispute attests. Governor Ryan's appoint-
ments to various government offices are another. In Jefferson's
words, the executive should not have to "encounter the odium of
putting others in their places."' 9 Yet the government cannot
come to a complete halt during a lame duck period. Indictments
must be filed to comply with speedy trial guarantees, regulations
must be finalized consistent with administrative law, briefs must
be served pursuant to court deadlines-and the President or
state governor retains authority over these and many other im-
portant decisions, whenever they occur. The government, in
short, must go on. But the lame duck period should not be seen
as a license to reward friends, punish enemies, or frustrate the
incoming officials whom the people have elected. At the very
least, lame duck executives should heed Jefferson's admonition
not to be "personally unkind.""1 '
Lame duck legislatures present a different challenge. Again,
it is difficult to understand why legislation that could not be en-
acted before election day suddenly becomes so urgent immedi-
ately thereafter. Yet it is easier to imagine a crisis developing for
which a rapid legislative response is necessary. I would allow for
such legislation, while blocking strategic lawmaking like the Ju-
diciary Act of 1801 and the District of Columbia courts act. Both
goals could be achieved by requiring a two-thirds supermajority
for any bills that are considered by the legislature during the
lame duck period. As John McGinnis and Mike Rappaport have
argued, legislative supermajority rules "may promote a more
harmonious political existence by making it harder for interest
groups to acquire other people's resources for themselves."'
11
Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport describe such rules "as the
first drafts of a blueprint to restore the Framers' vision of a lim-
ited government."" 2 The case for a limited government is all the
more compelling during a lame duck period. It is the rare law
109. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, supra note 1.
110. Id.
111. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitu-
tional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 372 (1999).
112. Id. at 372.
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that was not sufficiently important for the legislature to enact be-
fore an election but which is so important that it must be enacted
before the new legislature takes office. And when such a law ex-
ists, the requisite supermajority of the lame duck legislature can
approve it."'
The ultimate solution to the lame duck problem is to elimi-
nate the lame duck period. Altogether. We tried to do that once,
but the framers of the twentieth amendment failed to account
for the governmental business that can be done between election
day in November and inauguration day in January. The original
reasons for the delay between an election and its effectiveness -
to wit, the time it takes to learn about the results of the election
and for the new officials to travel to the seat of government-
have long been obsolete. The election of 1800 has already
yielded one constitutional amendment in response to the tie vote
between Jefferson and Burr; another amendment could prevent
the recurrence of the events that divided Jefferson and Adams.
So the best birthday present that I can suggest is to eliminate the
lame ducks that produced William Marbury's appointment, and
Marbury v. Madison, once and for all.
113. An alternative solution is suggested by a North Carolina statute that "prohibits
lame-duck votes in the month after a [city] council election." Stephen C. Keady, Recent
Developments, Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the Fate of Condi-
tional Zoning in North Carolina, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1155, 1159 n.25 (2001).
